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Mapping Legitimacy Discourses in Democratic Nation States: 
Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States Compared 
ABSTRACT 
This working paper first outlines the contours of a discourse analytical approach to the 
study of legitimation processes and then presents findings from a quantitative analysis 
of legitimacy-related communication in selected print media of the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and the United States in 2004. Our data suggest considerable differences 
between the three countries with regard to levels of (de)legitimation, privileged legiti-
mation resources, and legitimation styles. The micro dynamics of legitimation processes 
in 2004 were characterised by nationally specific legitimation attention cycles. Refer-
ences to internationalisation and deparliamentarisation – two trends that are often held 
responsible for a severe legitimacy crisis of the nation state and representative democ-
racy – play no more than a marginal role in legitimacy discourses. We conclude that 
evidence for a pervasive and full-fledged erosion of the nation state's legitimacy – or a 
uniform shift from input to output legitimation – is scant. 
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Mapping Legitimacy Discourses in Democratic Nation States: 
Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States Compared 
INTRODUCTION 
From the vantage point of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and 
the demise of most socialist regimes demonstrated the superior performance and legiti-
macy of liberal democracy, clearing the path for a global triumph of liberal democracy 
(Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1991).1 With the benefit of hindsight, and despite the fact 
that no plausible alternative has emerged, this expectation may be qualified as prema-
ture. As an export model, liberal democracy is faced with new authoritarian and funda-
mentalist challenges (Mandt 1993). In the western world itself, the diagnosis of a per-
formance and legitimacy crisis of the democratic nation state – already prominent in the 
1970s (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Habermas 1976; Hennis, Kielman-
segg, and Matz 1977, 1979; Offe 1972) – has returned with a vengeance. 
Whereas this older literature saw the crisis rooted in the internal contradictions and 
perverse effects of capitalism and liberal democracy, the twin processes of internation-
alisation and deparliamentarisation – which presumably undermine the autonomy and 
capacity of the nation state as a whole together with the decision-making and control 
functions of its core representative institutions – now tend to be identified as main cul-
prits. Both processes are usually described as having a largely negative impact on the 
operation of democratic institutions in the western world (Guéhenno 1996; Offe 1998; 
Scharpf 2000; Stein 2001): Internationalisation – the shift of traditionally national 
competences to international or supranational regimes and organisations (Albrow 2003; 
Goldmann 2001; Held 1995; Zürn 1998) – erodes the democratic nation state by gradu-
ally undermining its relevancy as a political force influencing the lives and well-being 
of its citizens (Dahl 1994). Deparliamentarisation – the demise of national parliaments 
as core decision-makers and the transfer of many of their powers to executives and judi-
ciaries, to independent central banks and expert commissions, or to private actors like 
business corporations and interest groups (Benz 1998; Börzel 2000; Hix and Raunio 
2000; Marschall 2002; Maurer 2001; Norton 1996; Schütt-Wetschky 2001) – means that 
even in areas where the nation state has preserved its responsibilities, democratic con-
trol of political decision-making – the most important benchmark for a political system's 
                                                 
1  We thank Friedhelm Neidhardt, Social Science Research Center Berlin, and our two anonymous reviewers for 
their useful criticism and suggestions. 
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legitimacy from the perspective of democratic theory – can no longer be taken for 
granted (Abromeit 1998: 19ff).2 
This pessimistic assessment of representative democracy at the national level is com-
pounded by the equally widespread perception that international regimes and suprana-
tional organisations are plagued by their own, and perhaps even more serious, legiti-
macy deficits (Abromeit 1998; Coultrap 1999; Follesdal and Koslowski 1998; Kuper 
1998; Lord and Beetham 2001). A more sanguine minority view rejects the dominant 
crisis diagnosis, though, positing instead that legitimacy beliefs in western nations are 
merely undergoing a shift from democratic input to output orientation – in short, that we 
are faced with a transformation rather than the erosion of legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). 
Hence, as political decision-making moves out of national spheres of sovereignty and 
parliamentary arenas, a number of traditional standards of democratic legitimacy seem 
to be falling by the wayside. Many academic commentators argue that this development 
has ushered in a legitimacy crisis of the democratic nation state and its core institutions. 
Tom Burns (1999: 182), to name but one influential voice, predicts that "without an 
effective redefinition of representative democracy's role or function, its profound inca-
pacity and marginalization are not only likely to continue, but to contribute to a loss of 
faith in and support for democratic institutions. It will become increasingly difficult to 
maintain the public image of the centrality of parliamentary democracy in the face of 
growing democratic deficits and substantial gaps between presumed responsibilities and 
actual capabilities of governing" (for similar arguments, see Scharpf 2000). Internation-
alisation and deparliamentarisation are thus seen as challenges not only to the normative 
legitimacy of the democratic nation state – its acceptability in the light of criteria pro-
vided by democratic theory or other strands of political philosophy – but also to its em-
pirical legitimacy – the factual acceptance of nation state institutions in the population 
(on this distinction, Barker 2001: 7ff; Beetham 1991: 3ff). 
It would certainly be a mistake, however, to assume that a political system's norma-
tive legitimacy – judged on the basis of democratic criteria – and its empirical legiti-
macy are necessarily related. After all, the normative premises of democratic theory 
might be of limited relevance for the citizens' attribution of legitimacy to their political 
system. This implies that even if internationalisation and deparliamentarisation have the 
presumed impact on democratic procedures in western nation states, the empirical le-
gitimacy conferred to their political institutions need not be affected in any significant 
way. The hypothesis of an imminent legitimacy crisis might thus be based on arguments 
                                                 
2  To some extent, deparliamentarisation is itself caused by internationalisation, as nation states are generally repre-
sented by their executives in supranational organisations. But other factors, such as the growing complexity of 
legislation and the imperatives of party government, are also important.  
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that have an inappropriate normative bias.3 To confirm or disconfirm the crisis hypothe-
sis, empirical research is needed that probes more deeply into the nature of legitimacy 
and legitimation processes in different political systems, into the beliefs and arguments 
on which public acceptance of political institutions is grounded, and into the rulers', or 
their rivals', legitimacy claims (on the relatively neglected aspect of self-legitimation, 
Barker 2001). 
In this paper, we sketch a conceptual and methodological framework that can be used 
for this kind of inquiry and present empirical results on the structures and trajectories of 
public legitimation in three OECD countries: Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United 
States. We address the following questions: How can a nation state's empirical legiti-
macy be mapped? Which resources are used in its legitimation, and how diverse and 
robust are they? Do these resources reflect the arguments and criteria privileged by de-
mocratic theory? Which general trends concerning legitimacy in the three countries can 
be discerned? To what extent do these trends superimpose idiosyncratic national de-
bates, policy agendas, institutional arrangements, and political cultures? And finally, is 
there any evidence that internationalisation and deparliamentarisation really undermine 
the nation state's popular acceptance?  
A DISCOURSE-ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON LEGITIMACY 
If empirical legitimacy is conceptualised as the factual acceptance of nation state institu-
tions, it needs to be distinguished from other forms and motivations of compliance such 
as merely habitual obedience, coercion and the fear of sanctions, or individual cost-
benefit calculations. Unlike these forms of forced or instrumental compliance, legiti-
macy refers to a kind of acceptance that is explicitly or implicitly grounded in normative 
beliefs and claims about the appropriateness of a political object (Barker 1990: 21ff; 
Pakulski 1986; Steffek 2003: 254ff). However, the factual or argumentative basis of 
these beliefs and claims may vary greatly. Thus empirical legitimacy has to be per-
ceived as a multi-faceted and dynamic rather than as a one-dimensional and static phe-
nomenon. In a comparative perspective, its character and foundations can, at any given 
point in time, differ among individuals and members of particular social groups within a 
political community, or between entire nations and cultures. In a historical perspective, 
                                                 
3  This charge can be levelled both against the neo-Marxist legitimacy crisis literature of the 1970s (Habermas 
1976; Offe 1972) and against its neo-conservative counterpart (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Hennis, 
Kielmansegg, and Matz 1977, 1979). Both literatures have been rightly criticised for inferring empirical delegiti-
mation processes and making dire predictions of a legitimacy crisis on the basis of normatively derived criteria 
and assessments of legitimacy. The evidence offered to corroborate these assessments was sketchy at best, there 
was hardly any attention to specific contexts and often, the operationalisation and measurement of empirical le-
gitimacy was skipped altogether (Kaase 1979; 1985). 
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attention shifts to the emergence and stabilisation, erosion and replacement of legiti-
macy beliefs and claims.  
This multi-faceted and dynamic character of empirical legitimacy is clearly ex-
pressed in some of the most influential theoretical concepts that have structured aca-
demic debates on the issue: Max Weber's (1978) seminal threefold typology of legiti-
mate rule based on claims of traditional, charismatic or legal-rational legitimacy; David 
Easton's (1965) distinction between ideological, structural and personal legitimacy as 
sources of diffuse support for a political system or, more specifically, for its regime, its 
authorities, and its political community; Fritz Scharpf's (1999) dichotomy of input ver-
sus output legitimacy that has become particularly influential in recent debates about the 
legitimacy of the European Union. All of these authors share the view that there are 
multiple sources of a political system's legitimacy, and that it is necessary in empirical 
research to extend analytic perspectives beyond the criteria derived from, or germane to, 
normative democratic theory. 
Yet as convincing as this reasoning is, it has so far not been translated into an em-
pirical research programme that is capable of fully grasping the multi-dimensional and 
complex nature of legitimacy. In most empirical contributions, legitimacy is seen as a 
measurable and quantifiable attribute of entire political orders or their core institutions. 
This perspective often results in a relative neglect of legitimation processes, and hence 
of the question how legitimacy obtains. Two types of methods tend to be privileged in 
empirical legitimation research: firstly, public opinion surveys that record individual 
attitudes and behavioural dispositions that are considered to be relevant for a political 
system's legitimacy (Almond and Verba 1963; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Dalton 
2004; Kaase and Newton 1995; Norris 1999; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1998; Pharr and 
Putnam 2000; Weatherford 1992) and secondly, the observation of (non-)conventional 
political behaviour, such as (non-)voting and protest activities (Klingemann and Fuchs 
1995; Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Norris 2002; Putnam 2000; 2004; Rucht, Koopmans, 
and Neidhardt 1999).  
While the data on empirical legitimacy produced by these methods is certainly not 
invalid or irrelevant, it suffers from serious weaknesses. In survey research, respondents 
only react to stimuli provided by questionnaires that offer respondents a preselection of 
political institutions to be assessed and of evaluative benchmarks to be commented on. 
This approach is unlikely to shed much light on the actual contours of legitimacy be-
liefs. Even more importantly, it neglects the context-bound nature of legitimation proc-
esses (Barker 2001; Dryzek 1988; Dryzek and Berejikian 1993; Potter 2001; Potter and 
Wetherell 1987; Rosenberg 1989). For instance, which are the aspects of a given politi-
cal order that respondents would highlight themselves, without stimuli? What are the 
sources and foundations of their legitimacy beliefs, including unexpected ones? How 
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are legitimacy beliefs and assessments formed and phrased, and in which political situa-
tions are they expressed? Finally, what do attitudes revealed in surveys mean, and how 
are they to be interpreted against the backdrop of specific contexts? 
Studies of political behaviour, on the other hand, have the advantage of focusing on 
readily observable political activities rather than artificially fabricated data, but their 
legitimating or delegitimating content is notoriously difficult to interpret (Sniderman 
1981). For example, do low levels of electoral participation indicate an erosion of le-
gitimacy, indifference, or high levels of satisfaction with a political order? Which forms 
of non-conventional behaviour are signs of active civic engagement, and which signal 
hostility towards the political system? Conversely, which forms of non-compliance are 
motivated by self-interest rather than by a denial of legitimacy? Moreover, the observa-
tion of political behaviour alone does not tell us very much about the specific aspects of 
a political order that are legitimated or delegitimated, or about the foundations and 
sources of legitimacy beliefs that drive people towards political action. 
This paper therefore introduces and applies a new approach to the study of empirical 
legitimacy, one that is based on the analysis of legitimacy beliefs expressed and legiti-
macy claims made in public communication. Discourses in which legitimacy is affirmed 
or contested have thus far been all but ignored in empirical legitimation research.4 This 
                                                 
4  Some recent books published in the field of political theory stress the importance of political conflicts about 
legitimacy and the need to study the legitimacy claims of different political actors (Barker 1990; 2001; Beetham 
1991). However, they do not translate theoretical insights into an empirical research programme, mainly drawing 
on anecdotal evidence instead. Empirical legitimation research, by contrast, continues to rely almost exclusively 
on evidence related to citizens' political attitudes and forms of political participation, both of which are analysed 
either in a comparative perspective – the "beliefs in government" series is a prominent example (Borre and Scar-
brough 1995; Kaase and Newton 1995; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Van Deth and Scarbrough 1995); similar ti-
tles outside of this series include Dalton (2004), Dogan (1988), Norris (1999), Nye, Zelokow, and King (1998), or 
Pharr and Putnam (2000)– or in case studies focusing on individual countries (Gabriel 1997; Uehlinger 1988). 
Some of these studies also address the influence of internationalisation and deparliamentarisation on individual 
attitudes and behaviour (Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995). The dimension of political communication, however, is 
only taken into account in some recent work on political protest that examines claims reported in the media in or-
der to survey protest events (Koopmans and Rucht 2002; Koopmans and Statham 1999). Discourse analytical 
methods are used in these studies to complement observation, but the focus remains set on protest as a form of 
political behaviour rather than on legitimation and legitimacy discourses as such. The same is true for studies of 
political communication that assess the importance of public discourses – particularly media discourses – for po-
litical decision-making, concentrating either on the operation of entire political systems (Denton and Woodward 
1998; Jarren, Sarcinelli, and Saxer 2002; Norris 2000; Perloff 1998) or on debates about specific policies (Deacon 
and Golding 1994; Ferree, Gamson, and Gerhards 2002). While political communication research is certainly a 
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is a serious deficit, since it is plausible to suggest that attitudes and behavioural disposi-
tions are predominantly formed and expressed in the context of social and communica-
tive interaction. Public discourses guide political action by shaping acceptable, hege-
monic or collectively binding interpretations of social and political events and relation-
ships. The participants of these discourses advance and justify, or contest, normative 
criteria for the attribution of legitimacy and their underlying value basis, and they de-
bate the extent to which these criteria are met in reality. In other words, the legitimacy 
of government institutions is continuously established and modified, withdrawn and re-
established in such discursive processes of interpretation and reinterpretation. Most of 
the political rituals that are used to affirm legitimacy – the celebration of national holi-
days, inaugural speeches, etc. – have a partly or entirely discursive character, too. The 
same holds true for many of those forms of political action – i.e., of non-compliance – 
that may be seen as the ultimate indicator of a system's legitimacy crisis. 
The analysis of legitimacy discourses in public fora such as the media, parliaments, 
courts, or academic journals – but also potentially in private contexts – enables re-
searchers to gain access to the complex and multi-faceted nature of legitimacy beliefs 
and claims without resort to fabricated data produced in artificial settings. Legitimacy 
discourses are the product of real-world social and communicative interaction. Their 
analysis permits us to compare pre-established notions about the configurations of ar-
guments that are likely to occur, or desirable, with "natural" and concrete textual data. 
Methods of text and content analysis can be used to map the structures and trajectories 
of legitimation discourses – the arguments that underpin the legitimacy beliefs and 
claims of political actors and citizens, the normative benchmarks and criteria of accept-
ability they propose, and the way they justify or frame their interpretations and evalua-
tions. Comparing legitimacy discourses in different spatial or temporal contexts also 
offers insights into the extent to which institutional arrangements and specific traits of 
national political cultures, or cultural factors at large, shape processes of legitimation 
and delegitimation (Fairclough 2003; Keller 2001; 2004; Nullmeier 2001; Schwab-
Trapp 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2001). 
ANALYSING LEGITIMACY DISCOURSES IN THE PRINT MEDIA 
In our paper, we apply this conceptual framework to legitimacy discourses in selected 
print media of Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States – three cases that have 
been selected in order to maximise variation in democratic institutional arrangements 
and political cultures. Our aim is to gain a better understanding of legitimation in these 
                                                                                                                                               
vibrant field, no comprehensive empirical studies with a systematic focus on legitimation have been published in 
this discipline. 
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countries, and to assess to what extent their political systems' legitimacy may be chal-
lenged by processes of internationalisation and deparliamentarisation. Of course, a focus 
on the print media enables us to capture only part of public legitimacy communication. 
Legitimacy discourses in the media are likely to differ from those in other fora, and any 
generalisations to empirical legitimacy as a whole have to be handled with care. It is 
plausible to expect, however, that media communication in liberal democracies mirrors 
popular perceptions of legitimacy at least to some extent, and that any serious legitima-
tion problems will be addressed in media reporting.  
For our study, we draw on a comprehensive text corpus of all articles touching upon 
issues of legitimacy that were published throughout the year 2004 in two top-quality 
newspapers per country.5 To be included in our corpus, an article has to contain explic-
itly legitimating or delegitimating statements, i.e. propositions that evaluate the respec-
tive country's political order, or its key government institutions and principles, as le-
gitimate or illegitimate, usually drawing on specific arguments. In our operational defi-
nition, a legitimation statement is thus characterised by three parameters – its object, its 
legitimating or delegitimating character, and the argument that underpins the proposed 
normative assessment.6 
Our term objects of legitimation refers to the institutions and principles that are being 
legitimated or delegitimated. We deliberately restrict our attention to particularly impor-
tant objects at the core of national systems of government: the political system as a 
whole; the political community (i.e., the nation and its citizenry); the dimensions and 
principles that characterise the modern western state in general (democracy, nation 
state, constitution/rule of law, welfare state, sovereignty/monopoly of legitimate coer-
cion); types of democracy (parliamentary v. presidential, representative v. direct, etc.); 
specific institutions and branches of government (monarchy or republic, executive, leg-
islature and judiciary, the electoral system, federalism/territorial organisation); and core 
groups of actors like the political class/elite, the party system, and the system of interest 
groups. Statements about the legitimacy of subnational and marginal institutions, indi-
vidual actors, and specific policies were not included in the analysis.7 
                                                 
5  The following papers were included in the analysis: Guardian and Times (United Kingdom), New York Times and 
Washington Post (United States), Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Tagesanzeiger (Switzerland). 
6  Overall, 1,720 articles and 2,712 legitimation statements were retrieved and coded. 
7  Thus we draw on Easton's (1965) distinction of regime, political community, and authorities, but ignore state-
ments on the acceptability of the latter and their activities. Here we are in line with most survey research in the 
area, which also aims to distinguish between the evaluation of authorities and assessments related to the political 
order as such. 
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An evaluation of one of these objects as legitimate or illegitimate occurs if a state-
ment explicitly affirms or questions the object's acceptability. Hence, only a specific 
type of communicative acts and only a small part of all statements referring to political 
objects qualify as legitimation statements. This restriction, for instance, excludes de-
scriptive or directive speech acts, the formulation of political demands, etc. (Searle 
1969). In our study, the evaluative character of a statement is coded dichotomously, 
distinguishing legitimating and delegitimating statements: legitimation statements have 
to characterise an object of legitimation as either acceptable or unacceptable, justifiable 
or unjustifiable. Of course, the significance of such statements for the object's viability 
and the citizens' behaviour towards it must not be overestimated. For instance, commu-
nicative delegitimation of a political system does not necessarily imply that citizens will 
refuse to follow this system's laws or to pay taxes. The significance of legitimation 
statements rather lies in the fact that positive or negative evaluations, if used in a similar 
fashion in a number of statements and over an extended period of time, may shape 
dominant beliefs in the population and thus become relevant for political action as well. 
A legitimation statement may either be generic, i.e. the object of legitimation is 
evaluated as legitimate or illegitimate without further justification, or it may refer to a 
specific pattern of legitimation. Patterns of legitimation are substantive criteria a 
speaker relies on when affirming or casting doubt on the legitimacy of an object. Since 
we do not want to rely too heavily on preset notions of the most likely, or normatively 
desirable, foundations and sources of legitimacy beliefs and claims, but rather seek to 
identify unexpected patterns as well, we do not approach the data with a fixed number 
of categories. Starting from patterns that play a prominent role in the theoretic literature 
on legitimation (e.g. popular sovereignty, accountability and responsiveness, efficiency 
and effectiveness), our list has been continuously expanded whenever new patterns 
emerged in the articles we studied. It now contains twenty-five individual patterns (Ta-
ble 1).  
These patterns can be classified in two dimensions. In the first dimension, we distin-
guish between the input and the output side of political decision-making. A pattern of 
legitimation is called input-oriented if it refers to the process of decision-making, in 
particular to the actors involved and the procedures followed. A pattern is output-
oriented if it refers to the results of the process, their quality and consequences.8 In the 
second dimension, we distinguish between democratic and non-democratic criteria.  
                                                 
8  Our definitions differ from those used by Scharpf (1999). In his conception, the relevant standard for assessing a 
polity's input legitimacy is the degree to which collectively binding decisions are made in a way that is responsive 
to the manifest preferences of the governed ("government by the people"), while a polity's output legitimacy de-
pends on its capacity to solve common problems ("government for the people"). However, these definitions con-
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Table 1 Patterns of Legitimation 
 Democratic Non-democratic 
In
pu
t 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s o
f p
ol
iti
ca
l p
ro
ce
ss
es
  
popular sovereignty – all power resides in 
the citizens 
accountability – rulers can be controlled and 
removed  
participation – citizens can actively contrib-
ute to decisions  
legality – domestic legal rules are respected 
international legality – international legal 
rules are respected 
transparency – political processes are public 
and accessible 
credibility – political processes conform to 
stated objectives, no hidden agenda 
deliberation – political processes are based 
on a rational exchange of arguments 
charismatic leadership – strong personal 
leadership 
expertocratic leadership – leadership by 
experts 
religious authority – political processes 
follow religious principles 
tradition – political processes follow tradi-
tional rules and customs 
moderation – political style is conciliatory 
and non-aggressive  
O
ut
pu
t 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s o
f p
ol
iti
ca
l r
es
ul
ts 
 
protection of human rights – individual and 
political rights are guaranteed  
democratic empowerment – material and 
cognitive conditions of meaningful par-
ticipation are guaranteed 
contribution to public good – political re-
sults serve the population as a whole 
reversibility – political results are not ir-
revocable 
effectiveness – solution to common problems
efficiency – political results are cost-
effective, not wasteful 
distributive justice – equal distribution of 
resources and burdens 
contribution to stability – enhancement of 
political stability 
contribution to identity – political results 
reflect or enhance the political commu-
nity's sense of identity 
contribution to morality – political results 
conform with moral standards  
contribution to sovereignty – enhancement 
of a polity's autonomy, capacity, power, 
or interest 
good international standing – enhancement 
of a polity's status in the international 
sphere  
This distinction is grounded in an undemanding definition of democracy, such as that 
proffered by Schmitter and Karl (1996): "a system of governance in which rulers are 
held accountable for their actions in the public realm by the citizens, acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives". Patterns of 
legitimation pertaining to decision-making processes or political outputs that are essen-
tial to the implementation of such a system are classified as democratic; patterns that are 
                                                                                                                                               
found the distinction between political inputs and outputs with considerations based on the democratic quality of 
the processes in question. In particular, while output legitimacy can be secured both by democratic and non-
democratic forms of governance, Scharpf seems to assume that input legitimacy is necessarily democratic in 
character. For an empirical analysis of the patterns of legitimation actually used in political communication, how-
ever, there is no reason to assume that statements referring to political inputs are consistent with the standards of 
democratic theory. 
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non-essential – though not necessarily antithetical – to democracy are classified as non-
democratic.9 
Table 2 Examples of Legitimation Statements 
Example 1: "The people and their representatives have been sent to the sidelines by the courts, and 
that’s not right" (Washington Post, 6 February 2004). 
Translation: "The judicial branch [object of legitimation] is illegitimate [evaluation] because it un-
dermines popular sovereignty [pattern of legitimation]". 
 
Example 2: "Totalitarian nations hold elections, but what sets democracies apart is offering real 
choices in elections. In recent years, contests for the House of Representatives and state legislatures 
have looked more and more like the Iraqi election in 2002, when Saddam Hussein claimed 100 percent 
of the vote for his re-election" (New York Times, 21 February 2004). 
Translation: "The electoral system [object of legitimation] is illegitimate [evaluation] because it does 
not secure accountability [pattern of legitimation]". 
 
Example 3: "We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of 
liberties of the world" (Washington Post, 9 May 2004). 
Translation: "The political community [object of legitimation] is legitimate [evaluation] because it is  
supported by religious authority [pattern of legitimation 1] and stands for the protection of human 
rights [pattern of legitimation 2]". 
 
A legitimation statement thus has the structure: [Object X] [is (il)legitimate] [because of 
Pattern Y]. Of course, actual statements in newspaper articles usually do not conform to 
this structure in a grammatical sense. The main task in identifying relevant statements, 
as well as in coding our variables, is therefore to translate the language used in the arti-
cles into the stylized structure on which our definition of legitimation statements is 
                                                 
9  On the basis of these definitions, patterns of democratic input are those that refer to the decision-making rules 
that guarantee self-governance of the citizens and respect for these rules, and to the procedural conditions that as-
sure the "enlightened understanding" (Dahl 1989: 111f.) required if citizens are to make adequate use of them. 
Many discussions of democratic legitimacy focus exclusively on such democratic inputs, neglecting that they can 
be rendered worthless if a society's power structures "systematically generate asymmetries of life chances [...] 
which limit and erode the possibilities of political participation" (Held 1995: 171). Therefore, our typology also 
includes patterns of democratic output which are characterised by references to political results that prevent the 
development of such "nautonomy" (as Held calls it). These include guarantees of individual liberty and of the ma-
terial and cognitive conditions for full participation in citizenship, as well as the absence of political results that 
serve only small sectors of the population or limit the options of future generations. Patterns of non-democratic 
input and of non-democratic output refer to characteristics or results of decision-making processes that may be 
valued in both democratic and non-democratic systems of government, but are not essential for democratic deci-
sion-making and the prevention of "nautonomy". 
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based (Table 2). To generate our text corpus, we selected all articles from our six news-
papers that contained at least one such statement.10 The articles could be news reports, 
commentaries or features, from any section of the newspapers. The statements reflect 
propositional content advanced by the authors themselves or by some person quoted in 
the articles. In addition to the object of legitimation, assessment as legitimate or ille-
gitimate and pattern of legitimation, three other variables were coded for each state-
ment: the issue or policy context in which a statement arises – i.e., the way in which it is 
framed – and the presence or absence of discursive references to internationalisation and 
deparliamentarisation. 
LEGITIMACY AND ITS RESOURCES IN DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
Do legitimacy discourses in Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States corrobo-
rate the hypothesis of a legitimacy crisis, or do they lend support to a more sanguine 
view? The frequency distribution of legitimating and delegitimating statements in our 
corpus provides us with a first indicator, although its significance is clearly limited. 
Overall, the balance tips slightly in the direction of delegitimation: 55 percent of the 
statements in our corpus give a negative assessment of the object of legitimation to 
which they refer, questioning or denying its legitimacy. This percentage, however, is 
not necessarily indicative of a pervasive legitimacy crisis, as the dominance of delegiti-
mating statements is not very pronounced. Moreover, media content is generally as-
sumed to have a negative bias, and hence critical assessments of political institutions are 
more likely to make it onto the pages of newspapers than affirmative ones, which may, 
in turn, dominate other discursive arenas.11 
A look at the national breakdown further nurtures scepticism with regard to undiffer-
entiated crisis diagnoses. The distribution of legitimating and delegitimating statements 
varies considerably from country to country, as Figure 1 illustrates. In the United States, 
legitimating statements prevail, if barely. By contrast, delegitimating statements domi-
nate in the two other cases, but much more clearly in the United Kingdom than in Swit-
                                                 
10  Texts were retrieved from an electronic media database in a two-step procedure, using automated search routines 
for the preselection of texts, and a close reading of paragraphs containing search words for the final selection. The 
employed dictionaries are based on our definition of legitimation statements and similar for each country, with 
country-specific adaptations for the various political orders and terminologies. The selection and coding tasks en-
tailed a considerable amount of interpretation. In order to ensure reliability, both tasks were not delegated to non-
expert coders but rather performed jointly by the authors. 
11  One could draw on extant literature in the field of communication research to estimate such effects, which may 
themselves vary between countries with different journalistic traditions and media systems (on this line of re-
search, see Eilders 1997; Galtung and Ruge 1974). 
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zerland. Evidence of general legitimacy problems, then, is weaker in the US and Swit-
zerland than in Great Britain. However, we refrain from defining any a priori quantita-
tive threshold beyond which we have to speak of a full-blown legitimacy crisis, as such 
an indicator would be extremely difficult to justify. Note that this problem also exists 
with other measures of empirical legitimacy, such as survey results. However, our dis-
course analytical method enables us to probe more deeply into the qualitative contours 
of legitimation in different political systems, and into the resources they draw on to 
secure their legitimacy. It therefore permits the identification of potential legitimation 
problems with greater precision than any aggregate threshold measure would. 
Figure 1 Delegitimating and Legitimating Statements (rounded to the nearest percent) 
67%
57%
48%
33%
43%
52%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
UK CH USA
Delegitimating statements Legitimating statements
UK 
(n=697) (n=776) 
S  
(n=1239) 
  
Both objects and patterns of legitimation may be powerful resources of a political sys-
tem's legitimacy. A particular object constitutes an effective legitimation resource if it 
enjoys high acceptance in the population and thus serves as "anchor" of legitimacy for 
the system as a whole; an argumentative pattern plays this role if it tends to produce 
legitimating rather than delegitimating communication. The wider the range of objects 
and patterns a political system can draw on to justify its legitimacy, the less it will be 
threatened by legitimation crises. However, the objects and patterns most likely to be 
addressed in public discourses in a particular political system – and thus its legitimation 
resources – depend in part on specific institutional legacies and political cultures. For-
mal and informal institutions play a decisive role in shaping political actors' interpreta-
tions of the world around them, and hence structure their discursive constructions of 
legitimacy. Therefore countries with different institutional traditions and political cul-
tures are likely to display particular legitimation styles, each of which tends to highlight 
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different resources when the acceptability of a political system or its institutions be-
comes an issue. 
Table 3 Objects and Patterns of Legitimation Referred to Most Often 
 of which of which 
 
Object 
state-
ments 
(%) 
dele-
giti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
Pattern 
state-
ments 
(%) 
dele-
giti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
political order 28 70 30 human rights 11 45 55 
political community 10 49 51 credibility 11 97 3 
political class 9 90 10 popular sovereignty 10 59 41 
democracy 8 66 34 accountability 10 80 20 
 
UK 
 
(n= 
697) 
constitution 8 67 33 effectiveness 7 74 26 
political order 31 56 44 effectiveness 15 83 17 
direct democracy 14 38 62 popular sovereignty 7 37 63 
political community 8 60 40 accountability 6 63 37 
federalism 7 54 46 human rights 6 31 69 
moderation 5 76 24 
CH 
 
(n= 
776) 
welfare state 6 74 26 
stability 5 14 86 
political order 56 40 60 human rights 18 22 78 
democracy 10 48 52 popular sovereignty 10 58 42 
political community 8 48 52 morality 6 54 46 
constitution 5 39 61 legality 5 39 61 
US 
 
(n= 
1239) 
electoral system 5 80 20 international standing 4 88 12 
 
Concerning objects of legitimation, it is plausible to expect that if a political order's core 
institutions and principles have been firmly in place for a long period of time, they will 
become part of the citizens' belief systems and thus tend to enjoy a higher legitimacy, or 
contribute more strongly to overall legitimacy, than those institutions that are of lesser 
importance, more recent additions to a political order's institutional structure, or more 
narrowly associated with specific political actors. Legitimacy discourses in Great Brit-
ain, Switzerland, and the United States confirm this hypothesis. To begin with, our data 
indicates that in none of the three countries, there is a general trend of delegitimation 
that affects all of the political system's institutions and principles. Table 3 shows that 
among the objects of legitimation referred to most often in each case, some constitute 
particularly effective anchors of legitimacy, as they are generally evaluated positively at 
a rate highly above average: the political community in the UK, direct democracy in 
Switzerland, and the constitution in the US. Conversely, certain objects turn out to be 
focal points for delegitimating communication, like the political class in the UK, the 
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welfare state in Switzerland, and the electoral system in the US. To analysts of the three 
countries, none of this will come as a great surprise, as well-known images used in pub-
lic communication come to mind: discourses about the exceptional qualities of the Brit-
ish people, as well as the traditional opposition of "court versus country"; the intense 
pride displayed by the Swiss in their peculiar institution of direct democracy; and the 
sustained reverence for the constitution and its framers in the US. 
Legitimation styles, however, also consist of patterns of legitimation that play a cru-
cial role in the self-legitimation of a political system or in public communication about 
political institutions and principles. A look at the legitimating and delegitimating argu-
ments used most often in the UK, Switzerland, and the US reveals that discourses in 
each country draw on a specific combination of patterns. Some of these clearly corre-
spond to institutional characteristics: For instance, the relatively high importance of 
credibility and accountability in British legitimacy discourse probably stems from the 
lack of formalised checks and balances in the country's political system, which means 
that informal conventions of good conduct and the possibility to remove political lead-
ers are the main safeguard against a strong government turning into an "elective dicta-
torship". Similarly, the central position of patterns like effectiveness, popular sover-
eignty, moderation, and stability in Swiss discourse reflects both the strengths and the 
downsides of the Swiss system of direct and consensus democracy: on the one hand, 
direct rule of the people and high stability, on the other, a potential for ineffectiveness 
and gridlock. In the US, the pattern of legitimation used most often is the protection of 
human rights, which includes references to freedom, obviously a fundamental American 
value. The comparatively high importance of legality points in the same direction. 
Moreover, a considerable number of statements refer to morality, reflecting the impor-
tance of religion in American society and politics.12 
Some of the most important patterns used in the three countries are particularly 
noteworthy as they display a clear legitimating or delegitimating tendency: For exam-
ple, arguments that refer to the protection of human rights tend to be legitimating in all 
three countries. The guarantee of human rights obviously constitutes one of the most 
reliable resources of legitimacy for western democracies, regardless of the specific po-
litical system. In addition, popular sovereignty and stability prove to be firm anchors of 
legitimacy in Switzerland, while legality plays a similar role in the US. In contrast, pub-
lic communication framed in terms of credibility and accountability in the UK, effec-
tiveness and moderation in Switzerland, and international standing in the US is most 
likely to be delegitimating. These patterns give a good indication of how the peculiar 
                                                 
12  The pattern "religious authority" itself was in sixth place in the US, only slightly behind "good international 
standing" on our list of the most frequent arguments. 
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strengths and weaknesses of the three political systems are evaluated in the national 
mass media. 
Table 4  Delegitimating and Legitimating Statements by Country and Aggregate Pat-
tern of Legitimation (rounded to the nearest percent) 
 UK  (n=697) 
CH  
(n=776) 
USA  
(n=1239) 
 of which of which of which 
 
state-
ments 
(%) 
delegiti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
state-
ments 
(%) 
delegiti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
state-
ments 
(%) 
delegiti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
democratic input 44 76 24 28 52 48 29 60 40 
non-democratic input 8 70 30 9 75 25 9 64 36 
democratic output 16 42 58 11 49 51 19 22 78 
non-democratic output 22 67 33 36 62 38 25 55 45 
sum democratic 59 67 33 39 51 49 48 45 55 
sum non-democratic 30 67 33 45 64 36 34 57 43 
sum input 52 75 25 38 58 42 38 61 39 
sum output 37 56 44 47 59 41 44 41 59 
general 8 61 39 12 46 54 11 33 67 
other 2 88 12 4 67 33 7 49 51 
total 100 67 33 100 57 43 100 48 52 
 
To further our understanding of the resources of legitimation at the disposal of the dif-
ferent political systems, it is useful to group the individual patterns according to the two 
dimensions – input v. output and democratic v. non-democratic – explained above (Ta-
ble 4). An analysis of these aggregate patterns underlines the great diversity of the le-
gitimation resources the three countries can draw on. Our data show that it would defi-
nitely be misleading to restrict discussions of potential sources of a political system's 
legitimacy to patterns of democratic input, as some contributions to democratic theory 
suggest. Rather, all four groups of patterns play a role in legitimacy discourses. Democ-
ratic input and non-democratic output are the patterns used most often in all three coun-
tries. In the UK and the US, democratic input patterns are the most popular, with non-
democratic outputs in second place. Interestingly, the situation in Switzerland is re-
versed, as non-democratic output is the most common pattern here. In all three coun-
tries, non-democratic input and democratic output patterns are used less frequently.  
A comparison of the extent to which legitimating and delegitimating statements 
make use of the four categories of legitimation criteria is also revealing. Two tendencies 
can be observed: Firstly, in Switzerland and the US, statements using democratic pat-
terns are more likely to be legitimating than those using non-democratic patterns. Even 
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if this effect is lacking in the UK, where there is no difference between democratic and 
non-democratic patterns, it is clear that democracy has by no means ceased to be a re-
source of legitimacy for the political systems we studied. Secondly, in the UK and the 
US, statements concerning political outputs are legitimating to a larger extent than those 
concerning inputs, while in Switzerland, there is almost no difference between input- 
and output-based patterns. Still, in all three countries, output-based arguments often 
play a reaffirming role in legitimation discourses. In each case, statements based on 
democratic output patterns – referring, for example, to the protection of human rights – 
are legitimating to a greater extent than those from any other category.  
These findings indicate that the hypothesis of an imminent legitimacy crisis of the 
democratic nation state may be exaggerated, or at least has to be differentiated. Con-
cerning objects of legitimation, it is important to note that in none of the countries, the 
political order as a whole, the type of democratic rule, or core institutions and principles 
are delegitimated at a higher rate than average. This suggests that even if internationali-
sation and deparliamentarisation indeed challenge the legitimacy of nation state institu-
tions, this challenge may be directed at specific, generally more marginal institutions, or 
at specific policies and/or political actors. Concerning patterns of legitimation, the most 
important finding is the considerable diversity of resources used to legitimate political 
systems and their institutions. If this range of sources for legitimacy beliefs is underes-
timated, the extent to which western democracies are threatened by an erosion of legiti-
macy is just as easily overestimated.  
Our findings on legitimation styles, however, also suggest that certain political sys-
tems might be more susceptible to a legitimacy crisis than others. If different political 
systems, depending on their specific institutional arrangements, political cultures and 
legitimation styles, draw on different resources of legitimation, the effects of interna-
tionalisation and deparliamentarisation on perceptions of legitimacy should not be uni-
form either. Rather, legitimation styles are likely to play a gate-keeper function vis-à-vis 
internationalisation and deparliamentarisation, and to influence the interpretations of 
these processes (for a similar argument, Busch 2003). For example, legitimation that 
relies heavily on patterns like accountability might be more seriously affected by inter-
nationalisation and deparliamentarisation than legitimation that relies on patterns like 
legality or stability. This might account for the differences that can be observed between 
the share of legitimating and delegitimating statements in our three countries. Before 
jumping to premature conclusions, though, we must turn to additional, short-term fac-
tors that influence the structures and trajectories of legitimacy discourses. 
NATIONAL POLITICAL AGENDAS AND LEGITIMATION ATTENTION CYCLES 
By their very definition, our legitimation statements have a generalising character: They 
assess basic and relatively stable elements of the regime or the political community as a 
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whole rather than the authorities, the politics of the day, or the minutiae of specific poli-
cies. In other words, they advance the kind of propositions that we consider to be most 
instrumental in providing a system of government and its citizens with long-term re-
sources and motivations of (non-)compliance, and hence to be crucial for the stabilisa-
tion or erosion of legitimacy at the system level. Yet while every effort has been made 
to include only this particular type of statements in the analysis, it would be inappropri-
ate to suggest that there is no linkage between legitimation statements in this narrow 
sense and wider political discourses covering issues of everyday politics. Quite to the 
contrary, and quite apart from the methodological problem of distinguishing attitudes or 
statements related to authorities from those related to the regime,13 we suggest that 
communication on the legitimacy of a political order is usually triggered, or at least in-
fluenced, by specific events, debates, and conflicts that dominate national political 
agendas and media reporting at any given point in time. 
A look at the issues and policy fields in whose context our legitimation statements 
were uttered serves to both complement and qualify the analysis offered so far. It en-
ables us, firstly, to identify the types of political events, debates, and conflicts that are 
most likely to foster legitimating or delegitimating communication. As legitimacy dis-
courses are tied into a wider political context, short-term fluctuations in their scope and 
nature are to be expected. This ebb and flow may move specific institutions and princi-
ples of government temporarily into the limelight, or it may put specific arguments, 
discursive positions and strategies to the fore. And not the least, short-term influences 
may give a temporary boost either to legitimating or delegitimating positions. In short, 
as our empirical material illustrates, we have to understand and examine the phenome-
non of legitimation attention cycles in the comparative analysis of legitimacy dis-
courses.14 
The identification of legitimation attention cycles serves a wider purpose. For we 
have to discount their effect in order to substantiate (a) findings related to the impact of 
national institutional arrangements and political cultures on discursive structures, as 
presented above, and (b) conclusions related to discursive trajectories – the change of 
prevailing legitimacy beliefs and claims under the influence of trends like internation-
alisation and deparliamentarisation. We need to corroborate that, or to what extent, the 
similarities and variations between Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United States 
emerging from our material indeed represent stable features or linear trajectories of their 
                                                 
13  This is a problem that we share with all other methodological approaches to empirical legitimacy. However, the 
articles from which we retrieve legitimation statements usually provide good clues for this disambiguation. 
14  Here we are of course indebted to Anthony Downs'  (1972) concept of issue attention cycles. 
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respective public discourses, or rather the contingent and ephemeral result of singular or 
regularly occurring events, and hence a mere snap-shot of national politics in 2004. 
Figure 2 Articles per Week by Country 
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Figure 2 uses a very simple indicator – the number of relevant articles per country and 
week – in order to carry home this point. We immediately note that the incidence of 
legitimacy communication greatly varies from country to country, and from week to 
week. Clearly, no linear trend of legitimation "awareness" over the span of the year 
2004 can be discerned (something that we hardly expected to find in such a limited time 
period), and no shared cross-national pattern of any kind emerges. Quite obviously, 
idiosyncratic features drive these national cycles.15 In order to shed light on them, we 
turn to data on the issues and policy fields that gave rise to our legitimation statements.16 
                                                 
15  The national differences at this micro level of legitimacy-related communication are equally pronounced if only 
the number of delegitimating statements per week is considered. Again, no cross-national pattern is visible. More-
over, within national discourses, no systematic relationship between the intensity of legitimacy debates, as meas-
ured by the number of statements per week, and the share of delegitimation statements seems to exist. A peak in 
legitimation "awareness" is therefore just as likely to foster an increased share of negative evaluations of the po-
litical order as it is to foster positive ones. 
16  A very fine-grained category system has initially been used to code the policy fields and other issues in whose 
context legitimation statements were made – notably fiscal, economic and infrastructural policy (13 subcatego-
ries); social, educational and cultural policy (14 subcategories); other dimensions of domestic policy (seven sub-
categories); foreign policy (nine subcategories). An additional group of nine subcategories covers instances where 
no reference is made to specific policy fields, but rather to political routine operations (electoral campaigns, etc.), 
or to political institutions and actors. The coding instruction is to identify the main issue dealt with in the para-
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Before we turn to the data, it may be useful to point out that they do not reflect issue 
attention cycles as such, but rather the extent to which discourses on specific policy 
fields and other issues triggered communication on legitimacy. Hence, for instance, the 
low percentage of cases related to environmental policy in our corpus may either mean 
that the field did, in 2004, not figure prominently on the public agenda altogether, or 
that it did, but without nurturing legitimacy debates. Conversely, the higher percentages 
reported below for several other fields may be no more than the effect of a temporary 
shift in issue attention, with a corresponding surge of legitimation statements, but they 
may also indicate that some issues are especially prone to give way to legitimacy de-
bates. 
As illustrated by Table 5, there is actually a high percentage of statements in each 
country that is not embedded in debates on specific policy fields, but rather tackles 
some key aspect of the political order – the electoral process, the functioning or reform 
of a specific institution, etc. – without mentioning policy debates. These statements are 
in many cases at one remove from everyday political conflicts, focusing precisely on the 
general and legitimacy-related assessments that we seek to identify. Note that the distri-
bution of legitimating and delegitimating statements in this particular category also 
closely mirrors the aggregate distribution: The share of delegitimating statements in the 
United Kingdom even reaches more than three quarters here, followed by Switzerland 
with about two thirds, and the US with slightly more than one half. 
The ranking of specific policy fields, on the other hand, differs markedly between 
our three cases. Social, educational and cultural policy triggers one fifth of all legitima-
tion statements in the British case, but ranks only fourth in Switzerland and the US. Of 
course, this picture may quickly change as soon as new issues are lifted onto national 
public agendas. In the American case, for instance, one important social policy reform – 
the introduction of a prescription-drug benefit in the Medicare programme – was en-
acted in 2003, whereas Social Security reform – an issue with potentially huge ramifica-
tions for the legitimation of the welfare state dimension of the American political order 
– may enter the agenda during the second term of the Bush administration. The distribu-
tion of legitimating and delegitimating statements in this category is remarkably similar 
across the three examined nations. In each case, almost three quarters of the statements 
are linked with negative assessments of some object of legitimation. 
                                                                                                                                               
graph from which the statement is retrieved, as entire articles may address a whole range of issues and policy 
fields. 
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Table 5  Ranking of Issues and Policy Fields, by Country, without other (unclassifi-
able) issues 
 of which 
 
Issue 
state-
ments 
(%) 
delegiti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
political routine operations, institutions and actors 41 77 23 
social, educational and cultural policy 20 71 29 
other domestic policy 15 44 56 
foreign policy 7 64 36 
UK 
 
(n= 
697) 
fiscal, economic and infrastructural policy 4 68 32 
political routine operations, institutions and actors 35 64 36 
foreign policy 14 31 69 
fiscal, economic and infrastructural policy 14 65 35 
social, educational and cultural policy 12 74 26 
CH 
 
(n= 
776) 
other domestic policy 9 46 54 
political routine operations, institutions and actors 52 52 48 
foreign policy 19 42 58 
other domestic policy 11 28 72 
social, educational and cultural policy 4 71 29 
US 
 
(n= 
1239) 
fiscal, economic and infrastructural policy 1 33 67 
 
Moving on to the third most important group of policy fields, we see that other domestic 
policy issues played a greater role in the United Kingdom and the US than in Switzer-
land, although the difference between the latter two nations is not pronounced in this 
regard. In our coding scheme, this category comprises predominantly regulative fields 
like public security and minority issues, which largely account for the relatively high 
percentages of British and American cases: Issues related to the American-led War on 
Terror and homeland protection were frequently debated in both countries, while the 
highly topical issue of same-sex marriage figured prominently on the public agenda of 
the US. The distribution of legitimating and delegitimating statements in this category is 
almost balanced in the British and Swiss cases, but strongly lopsided in the US. A Su-
preme Court ruling that rebuked the Bush administration and reinstated due process 
rights for foreign and American "enemy combatants" is partly responsible for this, as it 
was often linked with affirmative evaluations of the court, the entire judicial branch, and 
the constitutional order/rule of law. 
Unsurprisingly, foreign policy issues and debates surrounding the War on Terror, the 
occupation regime in Iraq, etc. are mostly responsible for the second largest group of 
statements in the American case, whereas the British involvement in the occupation has 
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not had the same impact. As shown above, issues related to these foreign policy devel-
opments did enter legitimacy discourses, but were more often framed as questions of 
domestic policy, for example in debates about government-media relations after the 
suicide of weapons expert David Kelly. In Switzerland, foreign policy ranks second, 
too, but other issues, such as the question of EU membership, obviously play a role 
here. Given the American public's well-documented propensity towards parochialism in 
the perception of international affairs, foreign policy may quite plausibly be expected to 
generate much less legitimacy communication in the US as soon as the American in-
volvement in Iraq is scaled back. In the British and Swiss cases, on the other hand, on-
going membership in, or involvement with, the EU is likely to ensure a continuing 
groundswell of legitimacy debates related to foreign policy. In this category, the distri-
bution of legitimating and delegitimating statements in the US is rather balanced. In 
Great Britain, it is skewed towards the negative and in Switzerland, towards the positive 
side. The British involvement in the War on Terror and the Iraq occupation seems to 
have contributed to delegitimating assessments of a variety of institutional features of 
that nation's political order. By contrast, the comparison between the alleged flaws of 
the EU and the strength of the national political order is a frequent argumentative pat-
tern in Swiss debates on foreign policy issues. 
Finally, fiscal, economic and infrastructural policy is relatively marginal in the Brit-
ish and American cases, but ranks second, together with foreign policy, in Switzerland. 
Here, the British and American cases show almost exactly inverse distributions of le-
gitimating and delegitimating cases, whereas positive and negative evaluations are al-
most balanced in Switzerland. We are now in a better position to explain the peaks in 
Figure 2. For each country, we focus on weeks that saw the number of relevant articles 
rise at least one standard deviation above the annual mean.17 A return to our text corpus 
reveals the country-specific events, debates, and conflicts that largely account for these 
peaks. Considering the US first, these events themselves, and the reasons why they were 
strongly accompanied by legitimacy communication, are quite easily identified. Discur-
sive contributions to, and political rituals linked with, the electoral campaign throughout 
the year and the presidential and congressional elections in November were a fertile 
source of legitimation statements. Hence five peaks can be related to President Bush's 
state of the union address and the Iowa caucus of the Democrats (January), the Democ-
ratic and GOP national conventions (July and August/September), the final week of the 
electoral campaign, and the immediate aftermath of the elections. These events, and 
discursive contributions like the candidates' televised debates, acceptance, victory and 
                                                 
17  The 9th, 11th, 20th, 47th, 48th and 52nd week for Great Britain, the 4th, 19th, 31st, 44th and 45th week for the US, and 
the 12th, 14th, 19th through 22nd and 49th week for Switzerland. 
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concession speeches, provided the backdrop for much legitimating communication of 
the "we are the greatest nation on the face of the earth" genre. The remaining peak coin-
cides with the breaking of news on the Abu Ghraib prison scandal – a singular event (or 
so one would hope) that notably gave rise to assessments of the rule of law in the US, 
the role of the executive branch, the oversight responsibilities of Congress, or the le-
gitimacy, moral underpinnings and international standing of the American political sys-
tem and national community as a whole. A quick glance at the British case is largely 
consistent with this finding on the function of certain political rituals as generators of 
legitimacy communication. Thus the Conservative party convention and the Queen's 
throne speech (in October and November) translated into a temporary surge of legitima-
tion statements. In Switzerland's direct democracy, important referenda seem to have a 
similar function – the peaks in May and November/December were related to referenda 
on old-age security and fiscal equalisation.  
This discussion of issues and policy fields that triggered legitimacy communication 
culminating around key events of the political year 2004 also helps us to put our above 
findings on national resources – and potentially stable features – of legitimation into 
perspective. Hence, for instance, the strongly negative assessments of the political class 
in the United Kingdom – often linked with credibility as pattern of legitimation – appear 
to be predominantly triggered by controversies over the Blair government's decision to 
participate in the Gulf War on the basis of faulty claims about Iraqi weapons arsenals. 
Ongoing debates on constitutional reform were another important trigger. We may thus 
hypothesise that the United Kingdom's rather bleak legitimacy situation will considera-
bly lighten up, and be more in line with the other two cases, as soon as debates on these 
issues begin to abate. In a similar vein, the War on Terrorism and the electoral cam-
paign, respectively, have undoubtedly contributed to raising the frequency of statements 
on the legitimacy of the constitution and the electoral system, of democracy, and of the 
political community in the US. The same appears to be true for the ranking of patterns 
of legitimation. Hence, for instance, the dominance of moral and religious arguments in 
the US corpus18 can clearly be related to specific events – although these patterns of 
legitimation will probably continue to play a greater role in the US than in the other two 
cases even after these events have disappeared from media agendas. Similarly, in the 
Swiss case, many references to the political system's ineffectiveness can be linked to 
referenda blocking important government policies, creating the impression of political 
gridlock. The increasing polarisation of the Swiss party system that has challenged 
many traditional structures of consensus democracy and made it even harder to bring 
                                                 
18  This result mirrors similar findings of survey research on the American culture wars and religious revival, thus 
strengthening our confidence in the discourse-analytical instrument. 
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about political reform also contributed to this impression. However, after the passage of 
an important reform initiative – the new system of fiscal equalisation – in November 
2004, more optimistic evaluations of the country's effectiveness might be expected in 
the future. 
At this point, we are not yet able to fully disentangle stable features and linear trajec-
tories – i.e., persistent change – of national legitimacy discourses. In order to do so, ad-
ditional and independent data on issue attention cycles – texts and communicative acts 
that did not get on our radar screen, as it were, because they did not contain legitimation 
statements – will be needed. Moreover, only the analysis of longer periods can yield 
more robust insights into the role played by singular events and regularly occurring po-
litical rituals in the affirmation or erosion of legitimacy. It is clear, however, that legiti-
macy obtains in processes that are a compound of short-term events, cyclical trends, and 
relatively stable institutional features, and that all of these effects mediate or even out-
weigh dynamics generated by long-term processes like internationalisation and depar-
liamentarisation. 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONALISATION AND DEPARLIAMENTARISATION 
Against this background, it makes sense to search for more systematic evidence that 
internationalisation and deparliamentarisation really play an important role in legiti-
macy discourses, as the crisis hypothesis sometimes advanced in the literature would 
lead one to expect. These trends may, in principle, impact legitimacy discourses in a 
variety of ways. The internationalisation and deparliamentarisation of governance struc-
tures and decision making processes could, for instance, raise or decrease the visibility 
of particular institutions (objects of legitimation), or the use of specific arguments (pat-
terns of legitimation). Thus if globalisation undermines the welfare state, and the wel-
fare state dimension, in turn, has an important legitimation function, we might expect 
more legitimation statements that assess the welfare state, draw on patterns of legitima-
tion like social justice, efficiency or effectiveness, and are formulated in the context of 
social policy debates. Hence some of the data presented above may indeed reflect the 
indirect effects of internationalisation and deparliamentarisation. 
However, such inferences must remain speculative. The two trends could trigger a 
growing number of delegitimating references to executive institutions (as too powerful) 
and parliaments (as increasingly unable to assume their traditional functions), but could 
just as well foster affirmative statements that defend parliaments, representative democ-
racy, and the nation state. Similarly, globalisation may of course be linked with a rising 
share of legitimation statements formulated in the context of foreign policy debates. Yet 
not all foreign policy conflicts, events, and issues are related to internationalisation, as 
defined here. In short, internationalisation and deparliamentarisation may well be influ-
ential background factors of legitimation processes. But only explicit argumentative 
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references to these political trends enable us to ascertain that the normative considera-
tions and presumptive causal chains on which the crisis hypothesis is ultimately based 
are indeed reflected in, and have the alleged effects on, public communication related to 
the legitimacy of the democratic nation state. 
Table 6  References to Internationalisation and Deparliamentarisation (rounded to 
the nearest percent) 
 UK  (n=697) 
CH  
(n=776) 
USA  
(n=1239) 
 of which of which of which 
 
state-
ments 
(%) 
delegiti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
state-
ments 
(%) 
delegiti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
state-
ments 
(%) 
delegiti-
mation 
(%) 
legiti-
mation 
(%) 
reference to interna-
tionalisation 
4 45 55 10 35 65 1 33 67 
no reference to inter-
nationalisation 
96 68 32 90 60 40 99 48 52 
reference to deparlia-
mentarisation 
2 69 31 1 57 43 1 100 0 
no reference to depar-
liamentarisation 
98 67 33 99 57 43 99 48 52 
total 100 67 33 100 57 43 100 48 52 
 
Our data provide little evidence that this is the case. As Table 6 shows, very few state-
ments contain direct references to internationalisation and deparliamentarisation. Only 
the Swiss sample offers a considerable number of such references. They reflect intense 
political discussions on Switzerland's bilateral relationship with (or future membership 
in) the EU, as well as debates on the country's role in the UN. Neither the British nor the 
American samples provide enough statements relating legitimacy claims to the process 
of internationalisation to enable us to discern any particular tendencies. However, we 
may cautiously observe that statements linked with references to internationalisation are 
mostly legitimating. It seems that references to international organisations and regimes 
with their democratic deficits and other shortcomings are often used to affirm the le-
gitimacy of national political orders and institutions, which continue to inspire more 
confidence than their international counterparts.19 
                                                 
19  This finding suggests that the growing interdependence of national and supranational political institutions may 
correspond to an increasingly relational nature of legitimacy beliefs and statements. For instance, dissatisfaction 
with national institutions may be compounded by dissatisfaction with the European Union, but it may also be 
compensated by a shift of legitimacy to supranational and regional levels of government. Similar effects could 
play a role in the relational evaluation of parliaments and institutions like the German Bundesbank, which some-
times enjoy high levels of trust despite their lack of democratic legitimation. We intend to explore these possibili-
ties in future research. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 24) 
- 25 - 
Table 7  References to Internationalisation Related to Selected Patterns and Issues 
(rounded to the nearest percent) 
 UK  (n=697) 
CH  
(n=776) 
USA  
(n=1239) 
 of which of which of which 
 
state-
ments 
(%) 
refer-
ence 
(%) 
no 
refer-
ence 
(%) 
state-
ments 
(%) 
refer-
ence 
(%) 
no 
refer-
ence 
(%) 
state-
ments 
(%) 
refer-
ence 
(%) 
no 
refer-
ence 
(%) 
Pattern  
international legality 1 0 100 2 69 31 1 57 43 
national sover-
eignty/power 
1 100 0 1 88 12 2 0 100 
international standing 1 0 100 4 59 41 4 0 100 
Issue  
foreign policy 7 38 62 14 41 59 19 5 95 
 
In a second step, we examine linkages between references to internationalisation, on the 
one hand, and selected patterns of legitimation or issues, on the other (Table 7). One 
should, for instance, expect that arguments related to international legality or statements 
formulated in the context of foreign policy debates often make explicit references to 
internationalisation. However, our data show – with the exception of the Swiss case – 
that even in statements with such "internationally oriented" patterns of legitimation or 
issues, the connection is made quite rarely. In the American case, the share of state-
ments that do not spell it out reaches as much as 95 percent. Perhaps in line with the 
current trend of unilateralism and suspicion vis-à-vis international organisations, they 
almost remain a non-issue in the retrieved legitimation statements. Only in the Swiss 
case, the expected consistency between "internationally oriented" patterns or issues and 
argumentative references to internationalisation can be observed. This finding is in line 
with the fact that it is precisely debates on EU or UN membership – political interna-
tionalisation – that account for most foreign policy related legitimation statements in 
Switzerland. The conformity of foreign policy action with Swiss (constitutional) law is 
always reviewed closely. Given the country's strong tradition of neutrality (extending to 
non-participation in international organisations) and national sovereignty, the potential 
impact of international relations on those two fundamental elements of the Swiss politi-
cal order and identity is frequently at the centre of legitimation statements. 
The very few cases with references to deparliamentarisation (Table 6) – especially 
the American ones – lend some support to the hypothesis that increasing deparliamenta-
risation affects the nation state's legitimacy in a negative way. In terms of related issues, 
objects and patterns of legitimation, the three national discourses are rather similar. Un-
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surprisingly, references to deparliamentarisation are frequently linked with the legitima-
tion or delegitimation of the executive and legislative branches, and of the judiciary in 
Great Britain. As for patterns of legitimation, arguments related to (the lack of) popular 
sovereignty and accountability, and to (gains in) efficiency and effectiveness dominate. 
Finally, deparliamentarisation is usually addressed in the context of debates on political 
routine operations and institutions. 
All things considered, there is ample reason to remain sceptical that internationalisa-
tion and deparliamentarisation strongly contribute to delegitimation, or structure legiti-
macy discourses, in the examined countries. While both trends may well have the al-
leged effects on state capacity and the role of parliaments in national decision-making, 
they trigger much less legitimation communication than might be expected, and do not 
seem to result in any dramatic weakening of public approval for the state and its core 
institutions. Our data thus provide little evidence that internationalisation and deparlia-
mentarisation have a major effect on the nation state's empirical legitimacy. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper is not meant to deny that the challenges posed by the current transformations 
of democratic government for the legitimacy of the western nation state are real. Our 
findings indicate, however, that they have – at least up to now – not resulted in serious 
or pervasive problems of empirical legitimacy. Several factors can be identified that 
prevent internationalisation and deparliamentarisation from eroding the nation state's 
legitimacy, or at least mediate their effects. Firstly, a political system's acceptance in the 
population is based on a wide range of resources, and is thus quite difficult to under-
mine in a comprehensive way. Even if one resource of legitimacy ceases to function as 
an effective anchor of legitimacy for the system as a whole, others may step in.20 Sec-
ondly, we find that the institutions and principles at the core of national democracies are 
deeply embedded in political cultures and belief systems. As a result, the political order 
as a whole, the type of democratic rule, or core democratic institutions and principles 
are considerably more difficult to delegitimate than more marginal institutions, political 
actors, or specific policies. Thirdly, processes of legitimation are highly volatile, reflect-
ing current policy agendas and debates. Thus long-term processes like internationalisa-
tion and deparliamentarisation are only one group of factors among many others that 
influence the structures and trajectories of the nation state's legitimacy. 
                                                 
20  Most importantly in our context, procedures of democratic decision-making are not the only source of legitimacy 
that the democratic nation state can draw on – yet as our study shows, even these procedures still constitute effec-
tive legitimation resources in many instances. 
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While our study casts doubt on the hypothesis of an imminent legitimation crisis of 
the nation state, we do not suggest that the contours of its legitimation have remained 
unchanged over the last decades, or can be safely expected to remain stable in the fu-
ture. Rather than conceptualising changes in legitimation as processes of erosion, how-
ever, one should view them as processes of transformation, affected by short- and long-
term political developments, as well as by relatively stable institutional or cultural fea-
tures, and shaped by discourses in which the content and structure of arguments privi-
leged in the justification of democratic governance are continuously challenged and re-
established. It certainly cannot be ruled out that such processes may result in serious 
legitimacy problems or crises, but given the differences between national legitimation 
styles and policy debates, and their respective influence on legitimation, it is implausi-
ble to expect that such crises will affect different nation states in the same or even in a 
similar way. Different institutional designs may be more or less susceptible to delegiti-
mation, and it is worthwhile to determine which forms of democratic governance are 
best suited to deal with the challenges to legitimacy posed by internationalisation and 
deparliamentarisation. But internationalisation and deparliamentarisation do not auto-
matically jeopardise the legitimacy of the nation state as such, in a general and uniform 
way. Undifferentiated crisis hypotheses are certainly not well founded. 
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